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An analytical approach for assessing the vulnerability of an artil-
lery battery in terms of the probability that the battery receives
counterfire is developed. This approach is based on a simplified model
that estimates the probability of detection by indirect fire weapons
locating systems of artillery weapons firings, and on recent work by the
Mitre Corporation in determining probabilities of counterfire on the
basis of battery exposure times and enemy counterfire response times.
An illustrative example is given to demonstrate the approach, and para-
metric variations are performed to investigate the impact of changing
tactics and weapons characteristics.
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The purpose of this thesis is to examine some approaches for inves-
tigating the vulnerability of a field artillery battery to counterfire.
The motivation for the analysis stems from recent technological advances
in indirect fire weapons locating systems (WLS). The capabilities of
these new systems and the potential for further advances in the area
point out the need for continual analysis of the survivability aspects
of field artillery tactics and doctrine.
B. OVERVIEW
A brief discussion of the nature of the problem and a description of
the counterfire system are presented in this chapter. Chapter II dis-
cusses the derivation of a simplified expression for the probability of
detection of a firing artillery battery by an array of WLS assets.
Chapter III examines recent work by the Mitre Corporation in the deter-
mination of the probability of a battery receiving counterfire given
that the battery has been detected and located. Chapter IV discusses an
expression for the probability of counterfire obtained from the method-
ologies of Chapters II and III. An illustrative example is given to
demonstrate the working of the model. Conclusions are presented in
Chapter V.

C. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The field artillery commander must be concerned with several threats
to the survivability of his firing units. Probably the most serious
threats are hostile ground attacks, air attacks, and counterbattery
fires. Of these, the one to which his units have few or no means to
respond is counterbattery fire. His troops may return fire on attacking
enemy aircraft, or attempt to repel a ground attack with their organic
weapons, but they will usually have no warning of an impending counter-
battery attack, nor will they usually have any indication of the
location of the hostile artillery unit conducting the attack.
The battery commander can minimize the possibilities of attacks on
his unit by careful positioning, camouflage, the use of local security
elements, and proper communications procedures. Such steps will, to the
greatest extent possible, prevent visual detection and detection by
communications direction finding systems, even while the battery is
firing.
However, there exists other means by which artillery weapons may be
located. Two of these which have as their primary function the detec-
tion and location of firing weapons are weapons locating radars and
sounding ranging systems. (Flash systems, which are normally closely
associated with sound ranging systems, depend on visual means for
detecting artillery weapons and so will not be addressed.) These two
systems inake use of the actual weapons firings to determine the loca-
tions of these weapons. Because a battery must provide supporting fires
to the maneuver forces, it is especially susceptible to detection by
10

these two means, regardless of any steps the commander may take to
conceal his unit.
Three alternatives are normally suggested to reduce the possibili-
ties of casualties due to counterfire: dispersion of weapons, "hardening"
of individual weapons positions, and displacement of the battery to a
new position [Ref. 1]. Dispersion is normally practiced, and positions
may be hardened when the situation permits, but a major advantage of
movement as an alternative in any combat situation is that it is the
only method of the three which effectively eliminates the possibilities
of casualties due to counterfire once the position is vacated. The
necessity for frequent moves is generally recognized because of the
anticipated fast-moving pace of modern combat and because the longer a
battery remains in a position, the greater its risk becomes of being
located by all enemy detection means [Ref. 1].
The most significant problem with displacing artillery batteries
frequently to avoid the effects of counterfire is that a battery which
is moving cannot provide immediate fire support [Ref. 1]. Other
problems include increased risks of visual detection, coordination
problems with other friendly units, troop fatigue, and increased wear
and tear of equipment.
A battery may be required to move under several circumstances. It
must move whenever it cannot provide fire support to the maneuver units.
It may move when its position becomes untenable due to an actual or
impending enemy attack [Ref. 1]. Intelligence sources and security
elements may provide the commander with some warning of ground or air
11

strikes, but he usually will have little or no information on whether or
not his unit has been detected and targeted for a counterbattery attack.
If this information was available to him and the tactical situation
permitted, he could move those vulnerable units before the counterfire
missions were fired, thereby reducing the possibilities of troop and
equipment losses.
It is unrealistic, given current capabilities and the inherently
uncertain nature of combat, to expect that this type of precise infor-
mation could be made available to the commander in a timely manner.
However, it is possible to develop methodologies which can lead to a
better understanding of the problem. To this end, approaches of the
type developed in subsequent chapters are suggested as means by which
such information can be obtained to serve as a possible basis for
decisions concerning movement of artillery units.
D. THE COUNTERFIRE SYSTEM
The counterfire system refers to those capabilities which enable a
force to detect, locate and engage the fire support assets of another
force. It includes target acquisition elements, intelligence and coor-
dination elements, and firing elements. A brief discussion follows of
the two target acquisition systems pertinent to this thesis, weapons
locating radars and sound ranging, as well as a discussion of the func-
tions of the intelligence and coordination element, to which will be
referred generically as the counterfire element.
12

1. Weapons Locating Radars
Weapons locating radars have existed in the counterfire system
for several years, but only recently have they been improved to the
extent that they have become the most accurate means for locating
artillery weapons other than by direct observation. A variety of radars
are in use or in production, but the principles behind the functioning
of each are basically the same. The radar "scans" a sector of the
battlefield where it is believed enemy artillery is located. The path
of flight of a projectile can be determined on the basis of tracking by
the radar or by the intersection by the projectile of multiple radar
beams [Ref. 2]. The path may then be extrapolated back to the position
from which the projectile was fired. The effectiveness of radars may be
degraded by precipitation and multiple weapons firings within a short
period. A significant disadvantage is that, because radars are active
emitters, they are subject to electronic countermeasures.
2. Sound Ranging
Sound ranging as a means for locating artillery weapons came
into widespread use during World War II. Weapons are located on the
basis of the relative times of arrival of the sound waves caused by
their firings at a "base" of several accurately located microphones
placed roughly perpendicular to the anticipated direction of fire.
Meteorological conditions which may affect the propagation of the sound
waves are taken into account. A major advantage of this means is that
it is passive in nature and therefore is less susceptible to electronic
countermeasures. The accuracy of the system in determining locations of
13

artillery weapons may be degraded by very windy conditions or by hilly
terrain. The occurrence of many weapons firings in a short time may
also significantly degrade the performance of the system [Ref. 3]. In
addition, preparations for the emplacement of a sound base may be ex-
tensive in terms of required survey and communications support.
3. The Counterfire Element
The counterfire element, usually found at the headquarters of
the unit controlling counterfire capabilities, acts as an intelligence
and coordination agency to determine hostile weapons locations and
dispositions and to direct the engagement of those weapons. Information
from all sources is collected in an attempt to put together as accurate
a picture of the battle as possible.
In response to guidance from the commander, a series of engage-
ment rules, called attack guidance, are established for the conduct of
counterfire operations [Ref. 4]. For example, he may specify that no
target be engaged with counterfire unless it is located to within two
hundred meters, or he may specify that all artillery weapons which are
located are to be attacked with a minimum of two battalion volleys.
These rules serve to outline the types of targets to be attacked, the
method of attack, and the conditions under which they are to be engaged.
Upon receipt of a piece of combat intelligence, the counterfire
element determines if a target location can be produced which is con-
sistent with the existing attack guidance. (The intelligence may
already be in the form of a target location, especially if it was
received from a WLS. ) The relative priorty of the target and the avail-
ability of resources are determined, and if the decision is made to
14

engage the target, efforts are made to assess the effectiveness of the
attack.
In some instances, a WLS may be attached directly to an artil-
lery firing unit. In this case, the WLS would report target information
to that unit's fire direction center (FDC). The FDC may act upon the
information by firing a counterfire mission, or it may simply pass on
the information to the counterfire element for further processing
[Ref 5]. In either case, the decision process through which the FDC
would go is fundamentally the same as that of the counterfire element.
The relevance of a discussion of the counterfire element to this
thesis may be obvious when one considers the possibilities of cancelled
counterfire missions due to priorities and resource constraints, of time
delays caused by processing the counterfire missions, or of communi-
cations failures between the various elements which make up the counter-
fire system. The vulnerability of artillery weapons is a function of
many variables, a very important one being the organization and
efficiency of the enemy counterfire element. An analysis which fails to
consider this may result in conclusions which are either optimistic or
pessimistic, depending on the viewpoint of the analyst.
E. THE PROCESS BY WHICH AN ARTILLERY BATTERY RECEIVES COUNTERFIRE
The process by which an artillery battery may be engaged with
counterfire is described as a series of discrete events as shown in
Table 1. Each event has a certain probability of occurrence, and if
these events are assumed to be independent, the probability of the
firing battery receiving counterfire is then given by the product of the
probabilities of these events occuring.
15

Table 1. Events in the Counterfire Process
1. An artillery weapon fires.
2. The firing is detected by a WLS.
3. The WLS produces a location of the weapon.
4. The target information is transmitted to the counter-
fire element.
5. The counterfire element, after considering:
a. Priorities
b. Resources
c. Accuracy of information
determines that a counterfire mission is to be fired,
6. The counterfire element transmits the counterfire
mission to a firing unit.
7. That unit fires the mission.
8. The target receives the counterfire.
The modeler may choose to account in his analysis for any or all of
these events; however, for subsequent examples given in this thesis, all
probabilities other than those of events 2 and 8 are assumed to be one.
Reasons for this assumption are the high priorities placed on the
destruction or suppression of hostile indirect fire weapons and the
dedication of a significant portion of available fire support assets
to the counterfire role [Ref. 6]. The probability of counterfire is
then given by the product of the probabilities of events 2 and 8. A
discussion of the derivation of these probabilities, as well as an
illustrative example, is given in subsequent chapters.
16

II. PROBABILITY OF DETECTION
It is generally assumed in analysis that artillery weapons locating
systems possess estimable probability of detection functions which
usually vary with range to the artillery weapon. For example, the Mitre
Corporation used the following expression for the probability of detec-
tion for sound ranging systems in the Counterfire Campaign Analysis
[Ref. 7]:
P (detection) =
1 + exp(5 log R/R)
where: R = range from the WLS to the weapon
R = 50% detection range of the WLS
Expressions of this type should be viewed, however, as conditional
probabilities given that the detection system is operating at the time
of weapons firing and is scanning the area where the firing takes place.
In other words, these expressions are probabilities of detection given
that the artillery weapon is susceptible to detection by a particular
WLS. Following this reasoning, the unconditional probability of detec-
tion P is given by:
P = P(detectionlWLS is operating and scanning the proper sector)
X P(WLS is operating) x P(WLS is scanning the proper sector)
The worth of considering these additional probabilities in the
analysis may be recognized when the following factors are considered.
17

1. Some weapons locating radars have fairly narrow "fields of view"
and so will not be able to scan the entire battlefield at one particular
time. Thus, a significant proportion of weapons may escape detection by
any one of these systems.
2. Radars, which are active emitters, are susceptible to electronic
countermeasures. As a result, they will probably not remain in contin-
uous operation through the course of a battle. Rather, they may scan a
certain sector for a period of time, cease operations for a while, and
then resume scanning in the same or another sector [Ref. 5].
3. Most detection systems have limitations in the number of weapons
they can detect or the number of weapons locations they can process in a
certain period of time. Therefore, if the combat becomes very intense
with a large number of firings in a very short time, some of the firings
may not be detected.
As stated previously, WLS have an estimable conditional detection
probability function which will be noted by P . To obtain an expression
for the unconditional detection probability, the probabilities that the
system is operating and scanning the proper area must be determined.
The probability that a WLS is operating at a random point in time,
denoted by P , will be defined simply as the fraction of time that the
system is operating. For example, if a radar scans the battlefield for
three minutes, is off for two minutes, and then repeats the same cycle,
the probability that it is operating at a certain time is .5. P may
also account for the time that a system has been "saturated" by multiple
firings in a short period of time.
18

The probability that a system is scanning an area where a particular
artillery battery is located is given by P
,
the fraction of the area of
concern which the WLS may scan at any one time.
Area of Scan
P =
s Total Area of Operation
(When the total area of operation is less than the area of scan, P =1)
P may be modeled in several ways. Figure 1 depicts a notional combat
scenario in which P is described as a ratio of sectors of a circle. P
s s
in this instance is simple the ratio of the central angles, or Wi/w2.
Another method for obtaining an expression for P (and the method
which is employed in subsequent examples in this thesis) is shown in
Figure 2. In this case, the area of concern to the WLS is considered to
be the distance W between the boundaries or the extension of the bound-
aries of the unit it supports. If the WLS was a sound ranging base of a
target acquisition battery of a U.S. division, the area of concern to
that system would be the distance between the division boundaries. An
assumption implicit in this concept is that a WLS will not attempt to
detect any weapons firings outside the boundaries of its supported unit.
Let r be the range from the WLS to the artillery weapons in thou-
sands of meters. For the purposes of this analysis, r is considered to
be the range from where WLS assets are normally located to the area in
which hostile artillery assets are normally located. For example, if a
WLS is doctrinal ly positioned eight to ten kilometers from the FEBA and
the enemy traditionally positions his artillery four to eight kilometers
19











Figure 2. Modeling P^
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behind the FEBA, r would be considered to be fifteen. Let w be the
angular distance in mils that the WLS may scan at any one time. Then
the width of an area scanned at a distance of r kilometers is rw, and
the fraction of the area of concern which is scanned by the WLS is:
's
= T (1)
for the method described by Figure 2.
Regardless of the method for deriving P
,
the following expression
will then define the unconditional probability of detection of a parti-
cular firing artillery battery by a single WLS:
P = P P P (2)
u cos ^^
For several WLS, the probability that at least one detects a parti-
cular weapons firing is given by:
m




where m = number of WLS
assuming independence between the WLS. This expression is then the
probability of occurrence of event 2 of Table 1.
It is recognized that equation (3) represents only a rough approxi-
mation of, and because of the assumption of independence between WLS, a
"pessimistic" (from the view of the artillery battery) expression for
the probability of detection. The assumption of independence may be
questioned, and the issue of sector overlap among WLS may be raised.
However, accounting for these factors in the methodology would raise
22

considerably the complexity of the analysis and may require the use of a
detailed simulation. The corresponding increase in accuracy may not
outweigh a significantly simpler analytical expression. Therefore,
equation (3) will be used in subsequent analysis.
23

III. CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING COUNTERFIRE
A. GENERAL
In connection with the Mitre Corporation's Division Support Weapons
System (DSWS) Survivability Analysis [Ref. 8], Niedenfuhr presented an
elementary quantitative analysis of the effects on DSWS survivability of
rates of fire, movement doctrine, and enemy counterfire response times.
The specific analysis performed focused only on DSWS; however, the
general methodology which Niedenfuhr developed may be applied to other
artillery weapons systems as well.
B. METHODOLOGY
Niedenfuhr defines an average period of time a battery is at risk to
counterfire in a particular location as the time from the start of the
battery's first fire mission to the time when that location is vacated.
This period of time, denoted by t^, is expressed as follows:
t^= 2^ . (.-Dtp . t, Mm-l)t^ (4)
where: m = average number of mission fired from a position
M = average number of rounds fired per mission
R = rate of fire of individual howitzers
n = number of howitzers per firing unit
t = average mission preparation time (time for reaiming weapons)
t . = average displacement time




Because of the expected uncertainties of combat, the actual exposure
time is taken to be a random variable, Tr, with distribution P(tp). Due
to the nature of the DSWS, Niedenfuhr expects that relatively short
exposure times will dominate and assumes that Tp is distributed exponen-
tially with density function:
•E
p(t^) = ^ exp (^)
The time at which counterfire is received is given by ? (enemy
response time) which is a function of the intensity of combat, effec-
tiveness of enemy equipment and troops, and enemy counterfire organi-
zations and procedures. Tp is also considered to be a random variable
with an exponential distribution with a lower limiting value of t. , the
minimum possible enemy response time. The probability that Tp is less
than t. is zero and, for Tp greater than or equal to t. , the density
function of Tp is given by:




where t is a parameter. The average response time is then given by:
For the counterfire to be effective, the response time Tp must be











T^ + r^ -1
exp
Niedenfuhr continues his analysis by obtaining expressions for daily
survival probabilities based on expected fractional damage values for
DSWS units receiving counterfire. The model is then exercised by vary-
ing the parameters of interest to investigate the results of different
tactics of movement, rates of fire, and organizations. For a complete
discussion of the assumptions, methodologies, results, and conclusions,
see Reference 8.
C. DISCUSSION OF THE DSWS MODEL
The analytical results which Niedenfuhr' s model produces are useful
for developing insights into the dynamics of the counterfire process.
The model is enhanced by the explicit treatment of exposure times and
response times as random variables in recognition of the stochastic
nature of combat. It is interesting to note the parallels between the
theory of this model and the theory of stochastic duels, in which the
times for duelists (for example, opposing weapons systems) to kill a
passive target are considered to be random variables. The prediction of
26

the outcome of a duel then involves, as in Niedenfuhr' s model, the
determination of the probability that one random variable is less than
another. Taylor gives a brief and excellent treatment of the basic
theory of the probability that one random variable is less than another,
as well as an application to the theory of stochastic duels [Ref. 9].
Niedenfuhr' s approach is useful for developing an expression for the
probability of occurrence of event 8 of Table 1; that is, the proba-
bility that a battery receives counterfire in a particular position.
This probability is conditional, however, given that the battery has
been detected and targeted for a counterfire attack. The structure of
the methodology and the definition of the variables implicitly assume
that a detection occurs on the first mission fired, when in fact the
probability that this would occur may be quite small.
In some situations, equation (4) may lead to incorrect exposure
times. This equation will only yield correct results when M is some
positive integer multiple of n. The term M/n from equation (4) defines
the number of volleys fired, and if M is not an integer multiple of n, a
"fraction of a volley" will occur. Intuitively, it is obvious that the
firing of a fraction of a volley requires exactly the same amount of
time as the firing of a full volley, but equation (4) will not reflect
this. The problem may be solved quite simply by restating equation (4)
as:
t^ = !!^ * (m-l)tp + tj ^ (m-Dt^ (4a)
where Nv is the integer number of volleys to be fired per mission.
27

Equation (4a) may be modified if either or both t and t are 1arqe
p w ^
in comparison to the time between firings of volleys. The time between
volley firings may be obtained simply by taking the inverse of the rate
of fire of a particular weapon. Conceptually, this time is the time
necessary for the weapon to "recover" from the effects of firing a
round. It may be seen from equation (4a) that the time between any two




and one "recovery time". It is obvious
P w
though that the recovery time may run "concurrently" with (t + t ).
Therefore, if (t + t^) is larger than the recovery time, the time be-




^ C'"-l)tp + t^ - (m-l)t^ (6)
The assumption that exponential distributions may be used for DSWS
exposure times and enemy response times is reasonable for the capa-
bilities which may exist in the future. However, for current and near-
future capabilities, somewhat larger times may be expected. In this
case, a distribution which reflects longer times, such as a log normal
distribution, may be more appropriate.
The probability of a "timely" enemy counterfire response, given by
equation (5), is based in part on the distribution of Tp, the artillery
battery exposure time. The distribution is scaled by the average ex-
posure time tp, which is a function of an average of numbers of rounds
fired. Because the analysis of this thesis focuses on the vulnerability
of a particular battery in a position, it is not appropriate to define
Tp in terms of averages. The exposure time then is no longer considered
28

as a random variable; rather, it is defined directly by equations (4a)
or (6) and is denoted by tp. tp is then defined as the exposure time
remaining immediately after the firing of the first of k volleys, tp
is the remaining exposure time after the second of k volleys, and so on.
29

IV. PROBABILITY OF CQUNTERFIRE
A. GENERAL
The methodologies presented in Chapters II and III provide a means
for obtaining an expression for the probability of an artillery battery
receiving counterfire based on probabilities of detection by WLS and on
the probability that the counterfire response by the enemy is "timely".
This probability is given by the product of events 2 and 8 of Table 1,
or:
P(timely enemy response (detection) P(detection) (7)
Define P^ (i=l,...,m) to be the probability that counterfire is
received as a result of the firing of the ith of m volleys fired in a
position. From equation (7),
p'l' = P(T^ < tp ) P , (8)
The cumulative probability of receiving counterfire before the position
is vacated, accounting for the first j of m volleys (j=l,...,m) is then
given by:




assuming independence between events.
A conceptual approach yields the same result. Consider a battery
which has just occupied a new position and will remain in that position
30

to fire m volleys. Immediately after the first volley is fired, the
probability that counterfire will be received before the position is
vacated is:
^CF,= P(Tr < ^e ) Pj = pT (10)
m
For the second volley firing, the probability that counterfire will be
received as a result of only that firing is the product of P2 and the




P2 (1 - Pre ) (11)
The cumulative probability of counterfire after the second volley is
then
CF2 " 'CFi '2 U ^'cp^P.C = Pre -^ P2 (1 - Pre ) (12)
and the cumulative probability of receiving counterfire before the
position is vacated, accounting for the firing of the first j of m
vol leys is given by
pj!, = p"!, ^ p"; (1 - pjip ) (13)
which gives the same result as equation (9).
B. PROBABILITY OF NOT RECEIVING COUNTERFIRE
The probability that counterfire is not received as a result of
those firings prior to volley j, (1-Ppc )> bears additional analysis.
^
J--1
In a conceptual sense, counterfire will not be received if a detection
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does not occur, if !„ is too long, or both. The methodology presented
thus far assumes that, once a detection occurs, a counterfire process
begins with an associated response time !„ which starts at the time of
detection and ends with the impact of rounds at the battery's position.
Therefore, if more than one detection of the same battery is obtained by
one or more WLS, more than one counterfire process will occur. It would
then be possible for counterfire to be received, for example, as a
result of a detection on the third volley, even if a detection occurred
on the first volley, because Tp for the first volley detection may be
longer than that for the third volley detection.
In light of the description of the counterfire element given in
Chapter I, this situation may not always be realistic. The counterfire
element could be expected to consolidate multiple detections by WLS of a
single firing battery into one counterfire mission. Consequently, only
one counterfire process would occur with only one response time T^.
Since there is only one response time to be considered in this case, the
probability of not receiving counterfire as a result of previous firings
is simply the probability that no previous volleys were detected, or
(1 - P;!!p ) = (1 - P.)^""^ (14)
^ j-1
Equation (13) could then be rewritten as
f'cF. = ^CF. ^ ^^"^R ' ^E.^ ^d ^^ Pd^^"'^ ^^^^
Note that the second term is simply the product of a timely response
and the probability that the first detection of the battery occurs on
32

volley j. This probability then has a geometric distribution with
parameter p^. The cumulative distribution function gives the probabil-
ity that a detection has occurred by volley j and will be denoted by P. .
There are cases, however, where multiple counterfire processes may
occur and equation (15) would not hold. These would include instances
in which WLS are attached directly to artillery units as mentioned in
Chapter I. It would be likely then that the counterfire element would
not be involved in the consolidation of multiple detections by all WLS.
Multiple processes may also occur in automated counterfire systems in
which WLS-generated counterfire targets are transmitted directly to
firing units. The effect would be, as in the previous example, that the
counterfire element is effectively eliminated from the process, thereby
eliminating the possibility of the consolidation of multiple detections
of a battery into a single counterfire process.
The use of equation (13) with no modifications would account for all
possibilities of multiple counterfire processes occurring. Using equa-
tion (13) modified as equation (15) would account for no such possi-
bilities. Use of both would provide bounds for the problem since it
could reasonably be expected that at least some degree of multiple
processing could occur. For the illustrative example given in the next
section then, probabilities of counterfire will be obtained both from
equation (13) with no modifications (Ppr ) and equation (13) modified as
m
^'






A generic counterfire threat provides a suitable scenario for
analysis of the application of the methodology. Table 2 lists values
for specific hostile (Red) WLS parameters and distribution assumptions
and for the friendly (Blue) artillery battery parameters. These values
and assumptions are rather arbitrary in nature, yet clearly any ones of
interest could be used. Values for m, the number of volleys to be fired
from the position (and which defines the exposure time in the position),
are taken to be 3 (Case 1), 5 (Case 2), and 7 (Case 3). Tables 3, 4,
and 5 list the probabilities of counterfire for each volley, and Figures
3, 4, and 5 depict these probabilities graphically. (In this example,
equation (6) is used rather than equation (4a).)
Table 2. Illustrative Example:
Red WLS and Blue Battery Parameters
Red WLS Parameters Blue Battery Parameters
Tn = random variable of Red response
times. Distribution is Rayleigh
m = 5, 10, 15
M = 18
with parameters: n = 5
t. = location parameter
= 5 minutes
R = 2
t = 15 seconds
P
t = scale parameter
t , = 5 minutes
d
= 10 minutes t = 2 minutes
w
W = 10 km
r = 10 km
WLS #1: '/^800 mils; P^.= .6; P^=.5
WLS #2: w=1600 mils; P^=.5; P^=.9
(from equation (3), P^=.582)
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Table 3. Case 1: m=3
VOLLEY s P^V^E.) \
pfll pfn
1 12.5 .245 .582 .143 .143
2 12.0 .217 .825 .196 .251
3 11.5 .190 .927 .215 .334
4 9.25 .086 .970 .219 .367
5 8.75 .068 .988 .220 .392
6 8.25 .051 .995 .220 .410
7 6.0 .005 .998 .220 .412
8 5.5 .001 .999 .220 .412













1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Volleys
Figure 3. Case 1; fTi=3
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Table 4. Case 2; m=5
VOLLEY % P(T,<t,_) \
pin pin
1 19.0 .625 .582 .364 .364
2 18.5 .598 .825 .509 .585
3 18.0 .570 .927 .567 .723
4 15.75 .439 .970 .586 .794
5 15.25 .409 .988 .593 .843
6 14.75 .378 .995 .596 .877
7 12.5 .245 .998 .597 .894
8 12.0 .217 .999 .597 .907
9 11.5 .190 .999 .597 .917
10 9.25 .086 .999 .597 .921
11 8.75 .068 .999 .597 .924
12 8.25 .051 .999 .597 .926
13 5.0 .005 .999 .597 .926
14 5.5 .001 .999 .597 .926
















0.0 I I I
10 15 Volleys
Figure 4. Case 2: m=5
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Table 5. Case 3: m=7
VOLLEY \ P(Vt,^) \
pfn pin
1 25.5 .878 .582 .511 .511
2 25.0 .865 .825 .721 .757
3 24.5 .851 .927 .808 .877
4 22.25 .774 .970 .841 .932
5 21.75 .754 .988 .855 .962
6 21.25 .733 .995 .860 .978
7 19.0 .625 .998 .862 .986
8 18.5 .598 .999 .863 .991
9 18.0 .570 .999 .863 .994
10 15.75 .439 .999 .863 .995
11 15.25 .409 .999 .863 .995
12 14.75 .378 .999 .863 .995
13 12.5 .245 .999 .863 .995
14 12.0 .217 .999 .863 .995
15 11.5 .190 .999 .863 .995
16 9.25 .086 .999 .863 .995
17 8.75 .068 .999 .863 .995
18 8.25 .051 .999 .863 .995
19 5.0 .005 .999 .863 .995
20 5.5 .001 .999 .863 .995


















1 10 15 20 Volleys
Figure 5. Case 3: m=7
2. Oiscusslon of Results
As expected, P^p is never less than P^p because of the addi-
tional probability resulting from multiple counterfire processes. Ppp
j
reaches its maximum value more quickly than Ppp because of the geo-
j
metric properties of equation (15).
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Differences between P^p and P^p are much more pronounced in
J J
Case 2 than in Cases 1 and 3. In Case 1, P(To<tc ) is always small, so
it would be expected that P^p and P^p would not differ greatly. In
j j
Case 3, P("''p<tc ) is still large when P. reaches its maximum, which re-
sults in P^p being large. For Case 2, however, P(Tj,<tp ) is not so
J j
large when P. reaches its maximum. Thus, P^p reaches its maxi mum
J
earlier than Ppp . The increases in P^p after this point again re-
j j
fleet the contribution of the additional probability of counterfire due
to multiple counterfire processes.
3. Parametric Variations
To examine the impact of various tactical and equipment char-
acteristic alternatives on the probability of counterfire, the model was
exercised several more times for m=5 while varying appropriate Blue
artillery battery parameters. Table 5 shows the results obtained by
reducing the number of rounds fired from eighteen to twelve. Table 7
shows the impact of both decreasing the number of rounds fired and in-
creasing the rate of fire from two to three rounds per minute. Table 8
lists the results for a decrease in waiting time between missions from
two minutes to one minute. The results of these variations on the
probability of counterfire are shown graphically in Figure 6. For these




obviously be lower as in previous cases.
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Table 6. Case 4: m=5, M=12
VOLLEY s P(Vt,^)
ptn
1 16.5 .484 .282
2 16.0 .454 .472
' 3 13.75 .318 .570
4 13.25 .288 .642
5 11.0 .165 .676
6 10.5 .140 .702
7 8.25 .051 .711
8 7.75 .025 .715
9 5.5 .001 .715
10 5.0 .000 .715
Table 7. Case 5: (ti=5, M=12, R=3
VOLLEY s
P(T,<t^,) pm
I 15.67 .434 .253
2 15.33 .413 .433
3 13.08 .278 .525
4 12.74 .259 .597
5 10.5 .140 .630
6 10.16 .125 .657
7 7.91 .041 .665
8 7.57 .032 .671
9 5.33 .001 .671
10 5.0 .000 .671
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Table 8. Case 6: m=5, T =1
VOLLEY s p(Vt,_)
pin
1 15.0 .393 .229
2 14.5 .363 .392
3 14.0 .333 .510
4 12.75 .259 .584
5 12.25 .231 .640
6 11.75 .204 .683
7 10.5 .140 .709
8 10.0 .117 .729
9 9.5 .096 .744
10 8.25 .051 .752
11 7.75 .037 .757
12 7.25 .025 .761
13 6.0 .005 .762
14 5.5 .001 .762
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Figure 6. Parametric Variations: Cases 4, 5, and 6
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For Case 4 (nv=5, M=12), the probability of counterfire has
decreased significantly from Case 2. A slightly larger reduction is
achieved in Case 5 (m=5, M=12, R=3), though the reduction may not be
significant relative to Case 4. The results of Case 6 (m=6, T =1),
which could be viewed as an increase in the intensity of combat or as a
decrease in technical fire direction time, show less improvement than
Cases 5 or 5, even though the exposure time is less than those of Cases
4 and 5. This is due of course to the larger number of volleys of
Case 6.
An additional variation was performed to examine the results of
an increase in t. and t, the parameters of the distribution of enemy
response times. The results of this case are shown in Table 9 and in
Figure 7. It can be seen that the probability of counterfire has de-
creased significantly from Case 2, and the results suggest the benefit
in terms of survivability which may be derived by affecting the enemy's
counterfire process in terms of increased response times.
These results show quite clearly that, for this model, a fairly
large reduction in exposure time is necessary to reduce by a significant
amount the probability of counterfire. This points out the potential
worth in terms of survivability of highly mobile artillery weapons with
high rates of fire and automated fire control systems.
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Table 9. Case 7: ni=5, t,=8, t=13
VOLLEY s P^V^^E.)
pin
1 19.0 .511 .297
2 18.5 .479 .493
3 18.0 .447 .625
4 15.75 .299 .690
5 15.25 .267 .738
6 14.75 .236 .774
7 12.5 .113 .789
8 12.0 .090 .800
9 11.5 .070 .808
10 9.25 .009 .809
11 8.75 .003 .809
12 8.25 .000 .809
13 5.0 .000 .809
14 5.5 .000 .809
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The methodology developed in the preceding chapters provides an
analytical approach for the investigation of the vulnerability of a
field artillery battery to counterfire in a given situation. It should
be recognized, however, that this is only a partial analysis of the
issue. A more complete systems approach would attempt to describe the
account for the other events in the counterfire process (from Table 1)
which were not addressed.
B. COMMENTS ON THE METHODOLOGY
Several inherent assumptions exist within the structure of the model
which have not been, and should be, addressed explicitly. These tend to
make the model rather situation-specific, and a wider application may
require some modification.
The structure of equation (3) implies that a linear or near-linear
forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) exists. This expression should
be altered appropriately for a situation where a nonlinear FEBA would
exist, such as in a encirclement.
It is also implicitly assumed that P is an appropriate expression
for sound ranging systems. In reality, both P and P , the conditional
probability of detection, are dependent on the configuration of the
layout of the microphone base. The area of coverage of a sound ranging
system is decreased by the employment of a curved microphone base, and
is increased by the use of a linear base.
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The model also assumes that weapons fire simultaneously in a volley.
Thus, only one detection can possibly occur for a volley of several
rounds.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS
It is safe to assert that vulnerability to counterfire will continue
to be an issue of concern in the future. The extended ranges and high
rates of fire of new artillery weapons, the increased lethality of
munitions, and the increased accuracy of WLS require that artillery
tactics and doctrine be constantly reviewed and modified if necessary to
keep pace with these technological advances in the counterfire arena.
As mentioned in Chapter I, WLS are only one means by which an
artillery battery may be located. The contributions of all intelligence
sources should be considered for a complete vulnerability analysis. The
contribution to the counterfire effort of communications direction
finding systems would be of special interest because of the large num-
bers of these systems in the forces of the Soviet Union.
An analysis of the Soviet counterfire system would also be of in-
terest. It is known that Soviet commanders would place a high priority
on the destruction of U.S. nuclear-delivery means [Ref. 6]. An assess-
ment of the effects of an intense, rapidly moving conflict on the
Soviets' ability to wage a successful counterfire campaign with current
and projected capabilities would be of significant value.
Numerous weapons effects models which describe the casualties in-
flicted on various types of targets by artillery fire are in existence.
An analysis which addressed the counterfire issue using one of these
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types of models in conjunction with an approach of the type presented in
this thesis would give a more complete assessment of counterfire effec-
tiveness in terms of probabilities of detection, timely enemy response,
and weapons effects.
A final area of interest would be the applicability of this method-
ology to an assessment of the vulnerability of mortar units to counter-
fire. The similarities of artillery and mortar units are such that the
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